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(2014). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:254. doi:
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Bach et al. (2014) proposed a novel model
of action understanding, the affordance-
matching hypothesis, to explain how peo-
ple both interpret and predict actions of
others. This model is based on two types of
information. The first is function knowl-
edge and is supposed to inform people
about the goals that can be achieved with
tools. The second is manipulation knowl-
edge and is thought to provide informa-
tion about the motor behaviors required
to achieve these goals. In their model,
function knowledge and manipulation
support action interpretation and action
prediction, respectively. Here, I mainly dis-
cuss the idea that manipulation knowledge
might be central to action prediction.
The distinction made by Bach et al.
(2014) between function knowledge and
manipulation knowledge is inspired to
some extent from a part of the literature on
apraxia (e.g., Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002;
van Elk et al., 2014). In their model, func-
tion knowledge is viewed as storing infor-
mation about the goals of tools, namely,
their usual function1. For instance, as they
1Note that, contrary to Bach et al. (2014), many
authors even assume that function knowledge is the
basis for predicting actions of others because it might
contain information about the specific actions associ-
ated with the physical properties of tools (e.g., van Elk
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, I will not discuss this aspect
in more detail here.
wrote, people know that “a tap is for
getting water.” By contrast, manipulation
knowledge would be useful to determine
what are the motor behaviors required to
use tools (e.g., knowing that a tap requires
turning it clockwise). This way of concep-
tualizing the cognitive bases of human tool
use has however been intensively debated
in recent years. Particularly, a growing
body of evidence indicates a strong link
in left brain-damaged apraxic patients
between the ability to actually use familiar
tools (i.e., the use of a tool with its corre-
sponding object, such as a hammer with
a nail) and the ability to use novel tools
to solvemechanical problems (Goldenberg
and Hagmann, 1998; Goldenberg and
Spatt, 2009; see also Osiurak et al., 2009;
Jarry et al., 2013; Osiurak et al., 2013). In
line with this, it has been proposed that
mechanical knowledge, but not manipula-
tion knowledge, might be central to tool
use, by allowing people to reason about
physical object properties (Osiurak et al.,
2010, 2011; Goldenberg, 2013; Osiurak,
2014). Contrary to Bach et al. (2014), the
mechanical knowledge hypothesis posits
that what people learn when using a tap
is not that a clockwise rotation of the
hand is needed, but rather that a clock-
wise rotation of the tap is needed. In this
framework, motor behaviors are adjusted
on-line on the basis of the prediction of the
tool use action to be done. Interestingly,
a strong link between mechanical knowl-
edge and the left inferior parietal lobe
has also been documented, challenging
the role of this cerebral region for the
storage of manipulation knowledge (for
reviews, see Goldenberg, 2013; Orban and
Caruana, 2014; Osiurak, 2014).
Another important aspect concerns the
role of function knowledge. Patients with
a selective impairment of function knowl-
edge have been shown to be still able to
actually use familiar tools with their cor-
responding objects as well as to use novel
tools to solve mechanical problems (for
a review, see Osiurak et al., 2011). In
other words, function knowledge is nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for tool use
(Buxbaum et al., 1997). So the intrigu-
ing issue is, what is the role of function
knowledge? It has been recently proposed
that function knowledge might be useful
for determining the social usages associ-
ated with tools (Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011;
see also Goldenberg, 2013; Osiurak, 2014).
For example, function knowledge can help
someone to know that a knife can be used
to cut tomatoes or meat, open an enve-
lope, peel a fruit, and so on. However,
this knowledge is not viewed as support-
ing tool use per se. After all, people can
know that a stethoscope can be found in
a medical context and that its function
is to “listen to the heart” without being
able to use it properly. To do so, mechan-
ical knowledge is required. Consequently,
as Bach et al. (2014) suggested, func-
tion knowledge can indeed be of primary
interest to interpret the actions of others,
by determining in function of the con-
text and of the social usages associated
with the tool the potential goals of the
action.
Having said this, I propose to revise
their model by modifying the idea that
action prediction is supported by manip-
ulation knowledge (see Figure 1). Rather,
I assume that people might predict the
outcomes of the actions made by others
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FIGURE 1 | Revised version of the model of action understanding of Bach et al. (2014).
by using mechanical knowledge. To
illustrate it, let us come back to an example
given by Bach et al. (2014). As they stated:
“Imagine, for example, the unpleasant sit-
uation of standing across from another
person holding a gun. Object knowledge
specifies that a gun is for shooting (func-
tion knowledge), and that, in order to
achieve this goal, the gun would have
to be raised, pointed at the target, and
fired (manipulation knowledge)” (Bach
et al., 2014; p. 3). In this example, Bach
et al. (2014) implied that the position of
the gun to be correctly used as well as
its utilization derive from manipulation
knowledge. However, it is also possible
to stress that mechanical knowledge is
needed to guide the user to correctly posi-
tion the gun and to use it. In addition, the
issue is how manipulation knowledge can
help you to know that the bullet can kill
you. This is purely independent from the
motor behaviors of the user. However, this
prediction can vary according to whether
you wear bulletproof vest or not. In other
words, to know whether the bullet will kill
you or not, you need mechanical knowl-
edge to compare the physical properties
of the bullet with those of your body or
of your bulletproof vest. Again, in this
case, manipulation knowledge is abso-
lutely unnecessary to predict the outcomes
of the action.
In sum, the model proposed by Bach
et al. (2014) provides an appropriate
account to think about the potential
sources of information at the basis
of action interpretation and predic-
tion. However, I am not convinced
that manipulation knowledge is the
appropriate theoretical construct that can
explain how people predict the actions of
others. Before concluding, I would like to
emphasize that the revised model I pro-
pose can be viewed as a strong version
of the mechanical knowledge hypothe-
sis, excluding any role for manipulation
knowledge in action understanding. This
might appear surprising considering
the significant literature supporting the
importance of this knowledge for action
and object representation (for recent pub-
lications, see Yee et al., 2013; Buxbaum,
2014; Buxbaum et al., 2014a,b). In a way,
there is here an apparent discrepancy rais-
ing the key issue of whether the brain
stores mechanical and/or manipulation
knowledge. The available evidence is not
sufficient to answer it, suggesting interest-
ing perspectives for future research in the
field.
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